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Abstract. Safety-instrumented systems (also called technological protections) play the significant role in prevention 
and mitigating of major accidents that can occur on thermal power plant. Activations of safety-instrumented system turn 
the power unit into safe state by shutting it down or reducing it productivity. The power generation process operates 
continuously. Any unplanned outage of generation equipment leads to undersupply of energy and big commercial losses 
to generation company. In Russia the values of allowed spurious trip rate for safety-instrumented systems are set by 
regulatory agency. These values are strict to all technological protections and do not take into account the differences in 
amounts of losses. This paper presents more flexible approach based on the Farmer’s risk criterion. Also risk reduction 
factor for spurious activation is proposed. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays thermal power plants (TPPs) are well 
studied facilities. Decades of operation in thousands 
of units all around the world produced data for 
technology development and great amount of studies. 
Part of those studies are dedicated to reliability 
issues.  
Redundancy of important equipment for safety 
and reliability is the topic of [1]. The decision about 
necessity of installing additional lubricate oil pump in 
these study is based on decision tree approach and 
costs assessment. 
Many papers are focused on maintenance 
activities. For example, [2] presents genetic algorithm 
with simulated annealing optimization method. 
Method helps in increasing reliability and reduce 
maintenance costs due to changing intervals of 
planned outages in depending on load demand. 
Several papers are about safety-instrumented 
systems (SIS). In [3] the industrial experience of 
using IEC 61508 [4] in the thermal power plants is 
discussed. It was concluded that in most cases TPP 
equipment does not require very high level of 
reliability of SIS. In [5] concepts of IEC 61508 was 
used for Furnace Safety Supervisory System (FSSS) 
of TPP. Reliability of FSSS was improved by 
implementing redundant actuator.  
Standard [4] uses SIS indexes of unavailability to 
response on demand (average probability of failure 
on demand or average frequency of failure) as a 
measure of reliability to promote the safety state of 
facility. Failure on demand can lead to the accident. 
Spurious failures in this approach are not taken into 
account because the result of such failures is safety 
state (shutdown or reduced productivity). In case of 
power plant such unplanned unavailability or reduced 
availability lead to big commercial losses. That is 
why assessment of spurious failures is crucial to TPP. 
The authors did not find any studies about TPP SIS 
spurious failures. Research of SIS spurious failures 
reliability in general is presented in paper [6]. 
Different approaches of computing spurious trip rate 
(STR) are described. In addition, the concept of 
spurious trip levels (STL) is criticized for economical 
point of view without any assessing of influence to 
the safety.  
This paper introduces the approach for determine 
acceptable values of STR based of the potential 
amounts of losses. 
 
II. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
A. SIS description 
SISs play significant role in accident prevention 
and mitigation of its consequences for hazardous 
facilities such as TPP. They perform safety functions 
by controlling the critical parameters. Crossing the 
thresholds by those parameters create demands for 
the SISs to turn off the process of facility or for 
reducing the productivity. 
The structure of SIS can be envisioned as it is 
shown on Fig. 1. SIS consists of sensors subsystem 
(S), logic solvers subsystem (LS) and final elements 
subsystem (FE). Subsystems form series structure. 
That means that failure of even one subsystem leads 
to failure of all system. SIS functioning in response to 
demands mode. Demands are produced by equipment 
under control (EUC) with frequency λde. In the case 
of TPP EUC are power unit itself, steam boiler, steam 
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turbine, feedwater pumps, etc. [7]. The results of SIS 
activation can be shutdown, reduction to 50 % 
productivity, reduction to 30 % or shifting to the idle 
conditions. If demand occurs, SIS should react. 
Presence of demand and absence of reaction due to 
SIS failure lead to the accident. SIS’s unavailability 
can be represented by probability of failure on 
demand (PFD) for SISs with rare demands (less than 
one demand per year) or by frequency of failure 
(PFH) if demands occur more often than once per 
year. The limits of acceptable/unacceptable level of 
failures on demand depend on results of risk analysis. 
Standard [4] recommends several qualitative, 
quantitative and semi-quantitative methods for risk 
analysis. Describing these methods is beyond of this 
paper.  
Triggering of SIS without demand is a spurious 
failure. Probabilistic representation of spurious 
failures is spurious trip rate (STR).  
Fig. 1.  Safety-instrumented system functioning (based on the 
concepts described in [4]).  
 
Each subsystem can be designed with different 
redundancy. Redundancy usually represents as KooN 
(K out of N), where K is a number of subsystem’s 
elements that is enough to trip subsystem; N is a total 
number of elements in the subsystem. In addition, 
K≤N. Subsystems with the same N and different K 
can have rather different reliability. Lower value of K 
makes subsystem more reliable to failures on demand 
just as higher value increases reliability to the 
spurious failures. Table 1 shows formulas for 
determining subsystem STR (according to the 
standard [8]). As it is clear from these formulas, STR 
values depend on several factors: 
• reliability of elements (λS – spurious failure 
rate); 
• mean time to repair/ restore (MTTR); 
• percent of common cause failures (βS). 
o STR risk acceptance criteria  
In the fundamental paper [10] risk R is described 
as triplet of scenarios si, probabilities pi (or like in our 
case frequency fi) and consequences xi: 
 
 },,,{ 〉〈= iii xfsR     (1) 
 
where i=1, 2,…, N is a number of scenario. 
 
 
 
Table I 
Formulas for str of sis’s subsystems with different redundancy [8] 
Architecture Formula 
1oo1 
SooSTR λ=11  
1oo2 
SsSooSTR λβλ += 221  
2oo2 
+= 222 2 SooSTR λ Ssλβ  
2oo3 
+= MTTRSTR Soo *6
2
32 λ Ssλβ  
2oo4 
+= MTTRSTR Soo *12
3
42 λ Ssλβ  
 
Russian standard [9] requires strict values of STR 
for each SIS and the total value limitation for all SISs 
together (0.2 failure per year, no more than 0.065 
failure per year for each SIS). The disadvantage of 
these reliability requiments is that it does not evaluate 
consequences of spurious trips. 
Spurious shutdown or spurious reduced 
productivity leads to uncertain losses, which value 
depends on load demand. Authors introduce an risk-
orientated approach to determine required values of 
STR based on load demand.  
In our study, according to [9] and other standards, 
we assumed power unit with 38 SISs that spurious 
triggering leads to significant changes of availability. 
The SISs were grouped to consequences categories, 
as it is shown in Table II. For the sake of space full 
list is not presented in this paper. 
 
Table II 
Categories of SIS 
Category of SIS Amount of SIS 
SISs that shut down the unit 28 
SISs that reduce efficiency to 
50 % 
8 
SISs that reduce efficiency to 
30 % 
1 
SISs that turn unit into idle 
mode 
1 
 
Such form of risk can be represented in tabular 
form or graphically as a set of points on x-f-plane, 
There are two kinds of values to assess consequences 
x of spurious trip: amount of energy (MW*h) that is 
not produced due to spurious protection triggering 
(see Fig. 2). and amount of money losses (EUR). 
Amount of money losses is more preferable becouse 
of its ability to take into account several significant 
factors, such as changing of cost rate, operational and 
maintenance costs, penalties to system operator (the 
main expenditure). Graphical representation involves 
acceptance criteria (AC) [11]. AC can be straight line, 
curve or staircase function. The unit of STR is 
failures per year. 
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Fig. 2.  Examples of the STR risk acceptance criteria.  
 
In the case of straight line (on a logarithmic 
scale), risk criteria is equation [11]: 
 
m
C XFR ⋅= ,     (2) 
 
where F are all values of frequency on risk criteria 
line; X are all values of consequences; m is a factor 
of proportionality. 
Then we can implement risk reduction factor 
(RRF) to measure required improvements for SIS: 
 
,
A
U
i STR
STRRRF =      (3) 
 
where STRU is unacceptable STR of the SIS; STRA is 
acceptable STR of the SIS. 
SIS needs reliability improvements if it not 
satisfied to the risk criteria. For understanding the 
role of subsystems or even the role single elements in 
the total SIS reliability authors used importance 
measures [12]. 
B. Power unit description 
One of the most important parameters of power 
plants operating on fossil fuel is input cost 
characteristic. Every generation unit (GU) is unique 
and has its own parameters, including fuel 
consumption, which depends on generation power. 
Generally, input cost characteristic B(P) can be 
represented as table or described by formula (4): 
 
,)( 2cPbPaPB ++=
  
 (4) 
 
where a, b, c – are coefficients of input cost 
characteristics; P – output power of GU; Pmin – 
minimal amount of power that can be produced by 
GU. Fuel cost characteristic can show not only how 
much fuel consumes GU during one hour, but also 
show how much producer pays for one hour operation 
and measured in MW/MWh or €/h correspondingly.  
The cost rate characteristic δ (P) evaluates how 
much fuel is necessary for production of 1 MWh or 
how much does it cost: 
 
PPBP /)()( =δ .   (5) 
 
The efficiency characteristic η (P) of GU – is 
inversely proportional to cost rate characteristic 
value, and could be described in few words: the 
higher load – the higher efficiency.  
 
)(/)( PBPP =η
   . (6) 
 
Fig 3 shows the example GU efficiency 
characteristic at TPP [13]. 
Fig. 3.  The relation of GU efficiency from the load. 
 
As result, every power plant, consisting on several 
GUs, has own optimal load dispatch according to the 
load profile and GUs’ characteristics. In case of one 
GU, producer try to load it as much, as it possible. 
That is why some disturbances and changes in unit 
output lead to losses. Such kind of scenario could 
occur because of protection spurious triggering and as 
a result, GU need to reduce its output, unplug from 
the load or shut down.  
With aim to evaluate consequences of the 
spurious triggering on power plant consisting of one 
GU, the authors considered following case. Fuel cost 
characteristics of GU are taken from [14] and 
presented in Table III. 
 
Table III 
Generators Data 
Parameter 
Pmin, MW Pmax, MW a b c 
30 200 208.4125 9.6506 0.0058 
 
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A. Losses calculation 
Let us assume that in normal regime the load of 
GU is 90% from nominal. In this case PG0 = 180 MW, 
and according to (4-5) the cost rate characteristic is   
δ0 = 11.85 €/MWh. 
Due to the fault, the output of GU changes to 0.5 
Pnom = 100 MW. As result fuel consumption is 
changing and fuel price for production δ1 = 12.31 
€/MWh. Depending on restoration time, producer fuel 
consumption losses appear only because of less 
effectiveness. It means, that producer lost 0.46 € for 
every generated 1 MWh with total losses of 83 € per 
restoration hour.  
We can see that fuel cost losses are not 
significant. However, we need to remember, that in 
this case, producer pays for other operational and 
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maintenance costs such salary and own needs as well 
as do not sell electricity.  For example, according to 
[15] the fixed operational and maintenance costs are 
913 €/h. Total amount of generation losses is 996 €/h. 
The most significant problem is, that according to 
nowadays conditions in electricity market, a producer 
have official duties to provide electricity to customers 
or system operator. In case of supplier default, it is 
obliged to compensate for the expenses incurred. 
Usually, this amount is registered in the contract. In 
our case, we consider general numbers taken from 
[16], where producer pays 0.77 € per none-provided 
kWh in case of interruption less than 48 hours. In 
case of generation reduction to 0.5Pnom, the total 
unsupplied energy is ΔW = 80 MWh, it means, that 
compensation might be paid is 61 600 €.  
Based on these two statements, the Table IV 
shows possible losses during protection spurious 
triggering different for scenarios. 
The same way calculations for scenarios 2 and 3 
are performed and presented in Table IV. Here 
generation costs are equal, because we assume, that 
fuel consumption in minimal margin is the same as 
without load, because generator should rotating. 
 
Table IV 
Possible Losses During Fault 
№ Regime’s 
changes 
Repair 
duration, 
h 
Generation 
costs losses, 
€ 
Fine to 
system 
operator, € 
Total, € 
1 90 % -> 0.5 Pnom 1 996 61600 62596 
2 90 % -> Pmin 1 1 206 100100 101306 
3 90 % -> 0 % 1 1 206  138600 139806 
4 90 % -> shut 
down 
2 1826 277200 279026 
 
As mentioned before, the time of restoration is 
varying, but in these particular calculations is taken 
as one hour for pp. 1-3. Most of the technologies have 
a limitations regarding to the minimum “rest” time 
before restarting. If the GU shuts down, the time of 
restoration is taken as two hours according to the 
average data for hot start presented at [15]. Here 
authors apply hot start, because of technology 
stopped less than 8 hours.  
The results show, that TPPs consisting of one GU 
is very dependent from faults and protection spurious 
triggering due to high penalties for none supply. 
Obviously, it is especially critical for TPPs with 
bigger capacities. That is why there is a reason in 
additional agreements with more solid producers, 
who can provide reserve for less money.  Installation 
of second GU, which increase costs (especially 
investment expenditures), but reduce possible 
penalties is an alternative option. 
B. Construction of risk acceptance curve 
According to [17], risk curve construction 
procedure includes following steps: 
• collect relevant data and sort it by the value of 
consequences; 
• calculate the cumulative function; 
• show results as diagram. 
As we mentioned above, existing reliability 
requirements [9] establish strict value for the 
summary STR that is equal to 0.2 failure per year 
without analysis of consequences. Authors assumed 
this value as a cumulative STR for the risk 
acceptance criteria. 
Cumulative STR was divided equally to each of 
four SIS categories from Table II. Individual 
acceptable STR for single SIS depends on the number 
of SIS in each category. The values of potential 
losses, values of STR for single SIS of each category 
and cumulative STR are presented in Table V. 
 
Table V 
Categories of SIS with ranged consequances and cumulative STR 
SIS category Consequences STR for the 
single SIS 
Cumulative 
STR 
SISs that reduce 
efficiency to 50 % 
62596 0.001786 0.001786 
SISs that reduce 
efficiency to 30 % 
101306 0.00625 0.008036 
SISs that turn unit 
into idle mode 
139806 0.05 0.058036 
SISs that shut down 
the unit 
279026 0.05 0.108036 
 
Diagram in Fig. 3 shows cumulative STR of data 
in Table V.  
Assume the SIS that triggering lead to shut down 
of GU. As an example, we chose a SIS of controlling 
pressure in lubricate oil system of turbine. Reliability 
parameters of SIS’s elements for spurious triggering 
and architectures of subsystems are in Table VI. Total 
value is computed by using formulas in Table I. 
 
Table VI 
Reliability parameters of SIS’s elements  
Element λS, 1/hour Architecture STR, 
1/year 
Controller 
0.0000057 
 
1oo2 0.005 
Pressure 
transmitters 
0.0000002 2oo3 0.000183 
Solenoid 
actuated 
valve 
0.00000423 1oo2 0.00371 
Total 0.008893 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Cumulative consequences-frequency curve of STR.  
 
Obtained value of the SIS’s STR is also presented 
in Fig. 3 as a single point. Result is unacceptable 
 Environment. Technology. Resources, Rezekne, Latvia 
Proceedings of the 11th International Scientific and Practical Conference. Volume III, 310-315 
 
 
314 
 
according to constructed risk acceptance curve. To 
make it acceptable based on (3): 
 
98.4
001786.0
008893.0
==RRF .   (7) 
 
That means that obtained STR goes beyond the 
acceptable value in five times and should be reduced 
significantly by changing the elements or the 
architectures of subsystems. 
Another way to construct risk acceptance curve is 
to use power function formula (8) and two scenarios, 
which STR and amount of losses assumed as 
acceptable [17]. 
 
baLLF −=)( ,     (8) 
 
where a, b > 0 are parameters of the curve, L is 
amount of losses. 
Consider two points of the future risk acceptance 
curve: 
.01.0)120000(
,1.0)65000(
=
=
F
F
    (9) 
 
These points are rather close to points on 
acceptance criteria curve in Fig. 3. Parameters a and b 
can be found as: 
.12000010
,6500010
2
1
b
b
a
a
−−
−−
⋅=
⋅=
   (10) 
 
Both equations include parameter a. After 
rearrangement the equation with unknown parameter 
b is: 
.322.310log
,102
2 ==
=
b
b
  (11) 
 
With known value of parameter b, parameter a is 
equal to: 
262567464804767
60000
10
322.3
1
≈=
−
−
a . (12) 
 
Risk acceptance curve can be described by the 
formula (13): 
 
322.3262567464804767)( −⋅= LLF . (13) 
 
Graphical representation of equation (13) in linier 
scale is presented in Fig. 4. Any value of losses can 
by examined for maximum acceptable STR value by 
function (13).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Example of acceptable STR curve.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we introduced technique of spurious 
trip assessment for SIS of thermal power plants. We 
showed that our technique is more flexible than 
traditional one [9] and is compatible with it. It can be 
used as an addition to PFD assessment to improve the 
decision making process by taking into account such 
factors as effectiveness of GU regime, fuel costs, 
maintenance cost and penalties to the system 
operator.  
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